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Introduction 
 
As many have observed, the internet promises wonderful opportunities for learning, 
communicating, participating and having fun; yet the same medium is also a means of 
bringing into the privacy of the home the very worst of society; most online content 
and activities fall somewhere – often ambiguously – in between (Livingstone, 2009). 
Governments worldwide are not only promoting broadband infrastructure and internet 
use throughout society but they are also making parallel efforts to recognise and 
address the associated risks. The opportunities and risks afforded by the internet to 
children and young people have attracted particular attention, itself not always in 
children’s best interests. Indeed, the early regulatory debates, typically led by moral 
panics about the internet’s undermining of childhood innocence, often served to 
polarise rather than advance policy developments regarding online risks and 
opportunities. 
 
Since those early days, regulatory debates have matured, seeking neither to establish a 
wholly new enterprise of online regulation but nor assuming that what holds offline 
straightforwardly applies online, although as a general principle this latter is accepted 
(van Dijk, 2006). The evidence base has also developed (as reviewed in Hasebrink, 
Livingstone, & Haddon; Internet Safety Technical Task Force, 2008; ITU, 2009), 
thereby supporting more informed multi-stakeholder deliberations. Developing the 
evidence base further, so as to understand which risks are encountered by which 
children and, crucially, when and why harm does or does not result, remains a major 
research task, along with  the related task of identifying which policy solutions are 
effective – particularly, which can bring about harm reduction without also curtailing 
children’s online opportunities. Linking these tasks is the effort to ensure that research 
findings are appropriately used by policy makers and other stakeholders in framing 
internet regulation and governance in the best interests of children. 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the World Summit on Media for Children 
and Youth, Karlstad (June 2010). It is based with permission on an abbreviated form of 
Livingstone (2011, ‘Regulating the internet in the interests of children: Emerging European 
and international approaches’, in Mansell & Raboy (Eds.), The handbook of global media and 
communication policy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell). It also draws material published in 
Livingstone, S. (2009), Children and the Internet: Great expectations, challenging realities 
(Cambridge: Polity). 
 2 
This paper reflects on emerging governance practices in the United Kingdom (UK), 
European Union (EU) and United States (US), to explore how competing interests are 
being managed in practice. Specifically, I draw on my experiences in representing the 
EU Kids Online network in a range of policy settings, including working with the 
EC’s Safer Internet Programme, the UK Council for Child Internet Safety and, before 
that, the Byron Review (Byron, 2008) and the Internet Watch Foundation in the UK. 
My aim is thus to combine what Bohman (1991) calls contextualised interpretation, in 
which the researcher draws on insider (or engaged) knowledge, and rational 
interpretation, in which the researcher draws on outsider (or independent, critical) 
knowledge. For a more developed version of these arguments, see Livingstone (2011). 
 
Three starting points should be clarified at the outset. The first is to define children’s 
interests, which I take from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 
also echoed in the Children’s Television Charter (World Summit on Media for 
Children Foundation, n.d.), and set out in Livingstone (2009a: 211) as a Children’s 
Internet Charter: 
 
(1) ‘Children should have online contents and services of high quality which are 
made specifically for them, and which do not exploit them. In addition to 
entertaining, these should allow children to develop physically, mentally and 
socially to their fullest potential; 
(2) ‘Children should hear, see and express themselves, their culture, their 
languages and their life experiences, through online contents and services 
which affirm their sense of self, community and place; 
(3) ‘Children's online contents and services should promote an awareness and 
appreciation of other cultures in parallel with the child's own cultural 
background; 
(4) ‘Children's online contents and services should be wide-ranging in genre and 
content, but should not include gratuitous scenes of violence and sex; 
(5) ‘Children's online contents and services should be accessible when and where 
children are available to engage, and/or distributed via other widely accessible 
media or technologies; 
(6) ‘Sufficient funds must be made available to make these online contents and 
services to the highest possible standards; 
(7) ‘Governments, production, distribution and funding organizations should 
recognize both the importance and vulnerability of indigenous online contents 
and services, and take steps to support and protect it.’ 
 
Given this deliberately ambitious conception of children’s online interests, a second 
and complementary starting point is to identify the risks posed to children’s interests 
by the advent of the internet. These have been classified by the EU Kids Online 
network first in terms of areas of the lifeworld (aggressive, sexual, values, 
commercial) and, secondly, in terms of the child’s role. This is to distinguish content 
risks (which position the child as recipient), contact risks (in which the child in some 
way participates, if unwillingly) and conduct risks (where the child is an actor) – see 
the table below (where the cells contain exemplars only) (Livingstone & Haddon, 
2009): 
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 Content 
Receiving  
(typically) mass-
produced content 
Contact 
Participating, not 
necessarily willingly, 
in a (typically) adult-
initiated activity 
Conduct 
Perpetrator or victim 
in peer-to-peer 
exchange 
Aggressive Violent / gory 
content 
Harassment, stalking Bullying, hostile peer 
activity 
Sexual Pornographic 
content 
 
‘Grooming’, sexual 
abuse or exploitation 
Sexual 
harassment, ‘sexting’ 
Values Racist / hateful 
content 
Ideological persuasion Negative user-
generated content 
Commercial Embedded 
marketing 
Personal data abuse Gambling, copyright 
infringement 
 
Balancing opportunities and risks as identified above will not happen by itself. Thus, 
the third crucial starting point for the present paper is to clarify what may be expected 
of ‘governance’ and ‘regulation’. In this paper, I use the term regulation in the 
broadest sense to refer to the relation between power and the ordering of social 
behaviour at all levels of society from the transnational organization, the nation-state, 
the subnational organization or community down to the level of the individual. 
Without developing the point here (see Livingstone, in press), I thus position the 
present arguments in the context of the significant shift underway in developed 
market economies away from top-down, state-led models of regulation towards a 
conception of governance that emphasises ‘the dynamic structure of rules between 
actors that are linked in different networks and permanently forced to negotiate, 
without a center that has the power to command and control’ (Donges, 2007). In other 
words, not only has the internet brought social changes but so too is the nature of 
regulation and the role of the state changing; the network metaphor, intriguingly, 
characterises both changes (Castells, 2002). 
 
‘We will not regulate the internet’ 
 
Yet surprising to some, it is commonly claimed that – as asserted by the UK’s then 
Secretary for State, Media, Culture and Sport, Tessa Jowell, in 2002 and echoed 
before and since by many others - ‘we [society, the UK government] do not intend to 
regulate the internet’(Commons Hansard, 2002, np). If this statement was intended to 
forestall debate or quell contestation over internet regulation, it failed, for rapid 
advances in technological innovation have meant that the rationale, prospects and 
practicalities of internet regulation have been hotly debated throughout the past 
decade. So why did Jowell say this, other than for the particular, if still puzzling, 
reason that she was seeking to justify why the then newly-proposed regulator, the 
UK’s Office of Communications (Ofcom), would not encompass internet regulation 
along with broadcasting and telecommunications regulation, despite being a 
converged regulator for a converged communications landscape (Livingstone and 
Lunt, 2007)? 
 
Civil libertarians, clearly, hoped she – and all others who make similar claims - meant 
that governments should not regulate the internet, to protect freedom of speech and to 
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prevent any growth in censorship. This position holds that arguments in favour of 
regulation for child protection should be rejected since these threaten to restrict (adult) 
freedom of expression online. Thus children’s needs are placed in tension with adults’ 
needs, and in any such a balancing act of the weak versus the powerful, children will 
surely lose out. More subtle variants of this position fear that advocacy for child 
protection opens the door to censorship of speech well beyond that which may harm 
children and, further, to the state surveillance of citizens. 
 
But, a simple opposition of adult freedoms and children’s protection surely 
undermines recognition of children’s positive rights, including their freedom of 
expression, along with adults’ rights to privacy and protection from harm. Indeed, it is 
possible to distinguish four regulatory goals at stake – support for children’s rights to 
freedom and to protection and support for adult’s rights to freedom and to protection. 
Can policy makers and society agree a strategy that avoids pitting a weaker 
constituency against a stronger? For those following the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UN, 1989), the issue is that of maximizing children’s online freedom 
while minimizing their exposure to online harm, as already noted above. Adult 
freedoms and rights to protection are also instantiated in national and international 
frameworks. The challenge is to recognise all four of these regulatory goals, not just 
those of child protection and adult freedom. 
 
A second reading of Jowell’s claim is that we cannot regulate the internet, because it 
is a vast and global technology, more horizontal than vertical in its structure and 
highly impractical to monitor. As Negroponte famously stated in 1996, ‘[t]he Internet 
cannot be regulated. It’s not that laws aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state is not 
relevant’ (cited in Drezner, 2004, p. 481). To be sure, international bodies find it 
difficult to attain and sustain consensus, and they typically lack the power of nation-
states to enforce compliance or punish transgression. Yet this version of the claim that 
internet cannot be regulated tends to assume a model of top-down, command and 
control regulation, notwithstanding the analysis of Donges’ (quoted earlier) and others 
regarding the growth of softer but more pervasive governance, this in turn developing 
partly in response to the shifting balance between national and international bodies 
and processes (see also Jessop, 2002). However, at least in developed countries, there 
are signs that international models of regulation increasingly influence rather than 
merely recognize or respond to the regulatory regimes of nation-states; the shifting 
role of regional governments such as the European Commission or the power of 
international organisations such as ICANN (the Internet Corporation of Assigned 
Names and Numbers), International Telecommunications Union or Internet 
Governance Forum is worth watching closely in this regard. 
 
A third interpretation of Jowell’s claim is that ‘we do not intend to regulate the 
internet’ because there is no need to regulate it - in short, because there is no problem. 
It is this argument that a wide range of child welfare professionals, children’s 
charities, teachers and educationalists, clinicians, parenting organizations, social 
workers and law enforcement are marshalling their evidence to undermine, with the 
focus on producing empirical evidence to document the nature, incidence and severity 
of online harm. Nonetheless, and despite a rapidly growing evidence base regarding 
online risks encountered by children, the evidence remains and will remain contested, 
not least because the methodologies available to research children’s online 
experiences are imperfect and because judgements of scale, reach and severity of 
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harm are particularly hard to ground in rigorous findings, even though these 
judgements are vital if policy interventions are to be proportionate. More positively, 
considerable efforts are now being made to generate and evaluate evidence,
2
 and that 
which is available is no less robust than for other areas of risk for children, where 
regulatory protections are taken for granted (Madge & Barker, 2007). 
 
To many critics, a fourth and final reading of Jowell’s claim is the most plausible, 
namely that it is not that we shouldn’t or can’t or see no need to regulate the internet 
but that we will not regulate it, because the commercial interests at stake are 
substantial and, while international in scale, profits largely accrue to certain dominant 
nation-states. Indeed, one may even suggest that, lying behind the strongly asserted 
arguments that one should not regulate the internet, for reasons of free speech, or that 
nation states cannot hope to regulate the internet in practical terms or that the 
evidence base for online harm to children is flawed or inadequate, it is this argument 
that really drives the debate. This argument, then, treats the internet as any other 
business, a source of both innovation and revenue, and thus one that requires a 
liberalized market not hampered by ‘red tape’ and ‘unnecessary’ interference from the 
state. Undoubtedly, as an argument in its own right, this last is supported by many 
market liberals and most of the internet industry. 
 
What is most difficult in debating internet regulation, I suggest, is not the nature of 
any of these four arguments but rather the persistent confusion among them, with 
advocates of any one position tending to shift ground and take up another position 
when the criticism becomes fierce, and with many arguing against internet regulation 
without clarifying which position they endorse or, even, the conception of regulation 
they are relying upon. The result can be some unholy alliances – between radical 
freedom of speech advocates and the industry, for example, and some unfair 
accusations – that to advocate child protection is to favour censorship, for example. 
As Szoka and Thierer (2009, p. 1) point out, in multi-stakeholder deliberations, it can 
too often seem that ‘online privacy, child safety, free speech and anonymity are on a 
collision course.’ 
 
‘The internet has always been regulated’ 
 
Yet, as Tambini observed, citing Lessig’s (1999) ground-breaking work on Code and 
other laws of cyberspace published well before Jowell’s claim, ‘of course, the internet 
has always been regulated’ (Tambini et al. 2008, p. 5). To address the four arguments 
in turn, it should be noted first that, despite routine reference to the American 
constitution in defence of an anti-regulatory position, there have always been 
legitimate restrictions on freedom of speech, even in the US – for example, restricting 
the dissemination of child sexual abuse images; and such restrictions are being 
debated anew with the expansion of hostile, bullying and harmful speech in peer-to-
peer networks among both children and adults (Collier, 2009). However, as Etzioni 
(2010, p. 162) observes, 
 
‘both individual rights and public safety must be protected. Given that on 
many occasions advancing one requires some curtailment of the other, the key 
                                                 
2
 See in particular the ongoing work of the EU Kids Online network at www.eukidsonline.net.  
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question is what the proper balance between these two cardinal values should 
be. The concept of balance is found in the [USA’s] Fourth Amendment …’ 
 
Second, there is growing optimism that international organizations can cooperate to 
good effect in shaping the internet’s global infrastructure - witness the increasing 
interest in and support for the Internet Governance Forum, notwithstanding that it has 
no decision-making powers, or the 2009 shift of ICANN from American to 
international management (ICANN, 2009). Perhaps most telling in this instance is the 
work of the European Commission in implementing self-regulation of mobile and 
social networking operators. This work and related work on privacy, personal data 
abuse and information rights led the European Union to endorse the ministerial 
Prague Declaration in April 2009, which advocates a ‘holistic’ cooperation across 
countries, including the promotion of ‘a safer online environment by fostering and 
assessing private sector self-regulatory initiatives, and by supporting initiatives 
providing parental control tools as well as positive content for children’ (Czech 
Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2009, p. 7).  
 
Third, as evidence grows that online experiences may harm the vulnerable, including 
but not only children, more and more organisations (ranging from law enforcement to 
children’s charities, schools and clinicians, businesses and governmental bodies) are 
extending their traditional regulatory activities from offline to online domains in order 
to exercise their duty of care to their clients, customers or public. In other words, it is 
evident to more and more bodies going about their ordinary (offline) business that the 
internet, far from posing no problem at all, is making a substantial difference to their 
operation and not always for the better. 
 
Fourth and relatedly, there are growing calls for regulation from business as well as 
third sector and state actors to impose greater obligations on online service providers 
so as to ensure online transactions are secure, copyright infringements are enforced, 
personal data is well-managed and brands have their reputations protected. The ethical 
discourses of corporate social responsibility departments may carry little force, but the 
commercial interests at stake in protecting the brand carry significantly more. 
Consider the struggle between Facebook and its users over privacy controls (boyd & 
Hargittai, 2010), the effort put in by internet service providers to implement terms and 
conditions for customer care that meet the satisfaction of consumers, the concerted 
action of the industry to eradicate illegal content or to ensure that financial frauds and 
scams are minimised, the development of parental tools and guidance by providers 
keen to be perceived as ‘family friendly’. All these and many other actions may be 
read cynically as attempts to ward off state regulation or to compete in the domestic 
market rather than as positive actions to advance the interest of children; nonetheless, 
this latter may still be the outcome. 
 
What regulation exists? 
 
Recalling that EU Kids Online classified online risks to children in terms of content, 
contact and conduct risks, the regulatory approach emerging in each domain can be 
summarised as follows, recalling the complex mix of governance arrangements that 
fall under the heading of ‘regulation’, extending well beyond top-down state 
interventions. First, since contact risks, especially online grooming and paedophile 
activity, are phenomena for which society has least tolerance, these are widely though 
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far from universally addressed by criminal law. Such legislative solutions are, 
however, generally reserved for high risk circumstances, since they also have the 
effect of constraining freedoms. The difficulty, therefore, is that they tend to presume 
that risk behaviours inevitably lead to harm, though in reality, children make many 
contacts online and only a few result in harmful encounters, albeit that these may be 
disastrous for their victims. Complicating matters, then, most online contacts, 
including most of those which lead to offline meetings, afford positive experiences for 
children, valuable therefore as part of their right to ‘freedom of assembly’. It is this, 
over and above the challenges of international law enforcement, which complicates 
the regulatory task of using legislative solutions to minimise contact risks to children, 
for it cannot easily be ascertained in advance which contacts are benign and which are 
harmful. Nor does research as yet pinpoint the particularly vulnerable children from 
among the many sufficiently resilient to avoid and/or cope with potential contact 
risks. 
  
‘Content is by far the most contentious area of media policy’ (Freedman, 2008, 
p.122), far more than has been the case for dealing with contact risks. Difficult 
questions of community standards and cultural values, the basis of any filtering of 
content, are exacerbated in a transnational context. Yet there remains widespread 
public concern that, for example, explicit images of heterosexual, homosexual, 
teenage, violent or bestial sexual acts are readily accessible via a simple Google 
search. Although traditionally tolerated in print or film, children’s access to such 
content has traditionally been restricted, whether through regulatory or social means 
(Millwood Hargrave & Livingstone, 2009). Already in the short history of the 
internet, regulators and industry have experimented with diverse initiatives for 
managing the conditions of access to inappropriate content, searching for the online 
equivalent of these familiar (and largely uncontroversial) means of managing content 
offline. Yet whether implemented through white lists, black lists, walled gardens, 
international content rating systems, more or less subtle filters applied at different 
points in the distribution chain or even outright censorship, many of these initiatives 
have failed. Nonetheless, filters, portals or walled gardens of one kind or another 
remain the preferred solution on all sides, especially if installed by parents within the 
household, and so efforts continue to improve these (Deloitte & European 
Commission, 2008; Thierer, 2009). Whether or not such filters should be, by default, 
turned on when the computer or internet service is first purchased, by analogy with 
virus protection or spam filters, remains contentious, even though any adult purchaser 
could easily turn them off. 
  
More recently, the risk agenda has been broadened to encompass not only how adult 
society may harm children but also how children’s own conduct may hurt or harm 
each other (and even themselves). For example, bullying has long been understood as 
including not only physical but also verbal and visual harassment among peers (e.g. 
by manipulation and circulation of images). Going beyond the important point that 
online bullying is often continuous with offline bullying (i.e., the bully pursues his or 
her victim across contexts on and offline, even into their bedroom), it is increasingly 
acknowledged that cyberbullying differs from offline bullying insofar as it 
simultaneously affords anonymity to the bully and publicity to the humiliation of the 
victim (Smith, Mahdavi, & Carvalho, 2008; Vandebosch & Cleemput, 2009). For 
regulators and, indeed, the industry, conduct risks are the least amenable, for they 
occur peer-to-peer and are not easily (or cheaply) observed. Thus, most regulatory 
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efforts focus on raising awareness (among parents), encouraging considerate codes of 
conduct (among children), facilitating peer support (via mentoring) and providing 
sources of support (helplines). Much effort also is directed at making young people 
themselves, rather than industry, self-regulating. Yet as with any effort to increase 
knowledge and awareness, the reach of such initiatives is often uneven and unequal, 
while the translation into behaviour change is uncertain (Livingstone, 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
 
A recent survey of policies in place suggests considerable diversity in governance 
regimes worldwide, although too little is known about which forms of regulation are 
effective in meeting public policy goals (International Telecommunication Union, 
2009). It is clear, however, that in many developed countries, regulatory regimes are 
generally moving towards a ‘softer’, more flexible, more indirect approach that 
disperses the role of the state, that establishes more accountable national and 
transnational regulatory bodies and that engages civil society (including children’s 
welfare bodies, parenting groups and youth organisations) in processes of governance. 
In parallel, considerable efforts are being made to devolve regulation down to the 
level of the individual, encouraging in individuals (parents, teachers, children) the 
responsibility to conduct their own personal risk assessment. As Beck (1986/2005) 
put it, in the ‘risk society’, risk has been individualised. Consequently, everyone 
‘need[s] to adopt a calculative prudent personal relation to fate now conceived in 
terms of calculable dangers and avertable risks’ (Rose, 1996, p. 58). 
 
But Beck and Rose are critical of a situation popularly described as ‘empowering’ for 
the individual. First, it tasks individuals with sometimes burdensome responsibilities 
for which they may lack resources or for which resources are unequally distributed. 
Second, the dispersal of regulation from state to self-regulation means that 
governance approaches “commonly lack[s] the procedural fairness and protection for 
fundamental rights that are encouraged by independent judicial and parliamentary 
scrutiny” (Brown, 2010; see also Schultz & Held, 2006). To equip individuals, 
governance regimes place increasing reliance on media or digital literacy policies, as 
in, for instance, the EU’s Digital Agenda (European Commission, 2010; for the rising 
importance of media literacy as a tool of regulation, see Livingstone, 2009). To 
introduce principles of fairness, transparency and accountability into self-regulation, 
governance regimes often include some degree of oversight – where ‘oversight’ refers 
to ‘second-order processes’ which ‘examine, review, and correct first-order 
processes’; this, Etzioni (2010, p.175) argues is the second crucial balance to be 
achieved in regulation – ‘not between the public interest and rights, but between the 
supervised and the supervisors’ (p.174). 
 
Recent examples include the EC Safer Internet Programme’s independent evaluation 
of filtering technology (Deloitte and European Commission, 2008), of the Mobile 
Operators’ Code (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009) and, most recently, of the Social 
Networking Guidance (European Commission, 2009). In relation to both sets of 
policies – those addressing individuals’ competence and those addressing firms’ 
responsibilities – consideration for children’s risks and opportunities online has led 
the way; nonetheless, the resulting governance approaches are couched in more 
general terms, benefiting (or otherwise) the wider public. Intriguingly, there is a 
degree of complementarity between media literacy policy (which is necessarily 
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limited by the bounds of individuals’ competence) and industry self-regulation (which 
is expected to step in as required to support the needs of individuals). For example, if 
children and parents understand and respect the rule that those under 13 years old are 
not permitted on Facebook or MySpace, then the social networking site need take no 
action; but insofar as individuals do not understand or respect this rule, the site is 
expected to take action as part of its self-regulatory guidance. Similarly, to the extent 
that parents lack the skill to install filtering technology, then technology providers are 
expected to redesign their products and provide a help desk. And so forth. In other 
words, the affordances of the online interface can be designed to fit more or less well 
with the literacies of users, and the result is more or less enabling or undermining of 
use. 
 
In cases where the risk at stake is unambiguous or uncontroversial, most would agree 
that the online environment should be designed so that little or no reliance is placed 
on the individual’s competence: examples might include preventing paedophiles from 
using social networking sites popular with children or ensuring that financial fraud is 
eliminated by securing payment systems; to rely on the competence of children in 
such cases seems unnecessarily hazardous. In such cases, a strategy of ‘safety by 
design’ (as already occurs in offline in the domains of engineering, urban planning, 
health and safety at work) can reduce risk without affecting opportunities. But in 
cases where the risk at stake is ambiguous (for example, making new online contacts 
may be beneficial but may be dangerous) or controversial (for example, is seeing 
online pornography harmless or harmful?) or dependent on circumstances (for 
example, most children are not tempted to take the advice of pro-harm sites but a few 
are vulnerable to such advice), the online environment cannot simply be designed to 
be risk free, for this is to undermine individual opportunities. Even then, ‘safety by 
design’ can reasonably be employed to reduce risks provided that individuals’ choices 
are not prevented entirely: examples might include the use of default filters that can, if 
desired, be overridden, or programmed-in reminders on sending images or posting 
personal information to think carefully before acting. Though the effect of such 
features is likely to increase media literacy, this remains to be established by 
empirical research. 
 
As should be apparent, in this paper I have sought to move beyond a framework for 
children’s interests that simply polarises consideration of online risks and 
opportunities, also rejecting a framework for regulation that simply polarises top-
down restrictive regulation and laissez-faire avoidance of regulation in the interests of 
(adult) freedoms. The task for researchers, therefore, is no longer primarily to chart 
the possible harms experienced by children online, in order to provoke regulatory 
intervention. Rather, a more complex research agenda is opened up, matching the 
complexity of the emerging governance regime as well as the complexity of 
children’s interests online. In short, researchers should investigate (and many now are 
investigating) the conditions of childhood that mean some children explore online 
opportunities and become resilient to the risks while (a few) others get hurt. However, 
they should also investigate (and here much more research is needed) the conditions 
of the online environment that render some sites more or less beneficial or hazardous, 
as a function of their design and institutional infrastructure as well as their practices of 
use, and some regulatory tools and strategies more or less effective, depending in part 
on their implications for media literacy. 
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